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CRIMINAL CORRUPTION:
WHY BROAD DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY
MAKE THINGS WORSE
Albert W. Alschuler*
Although the law of bribery may look profoundly underinclusive, the
push to expand it usually should be resisted. This Article traces the history
of two competing concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept (a
concept initially applied only to gifts given to judges) and the “illegal
contract” concept. It argues that, when applied to officials other than
unelected judges, “intent to influence” is now an untenable standard. This
standard cannot be taken literally. This Article defends the Supreme
Court’s refusal to treat campaign contributions as bribes in the absence of
an “explicit” quid pro quo and its refusal to read a statute criminalizing
deprivations of “the intangible right of honest services” as scuttling the
quid pro quo requirement. While recognizing that the “stream of benefits”
metaphor can be compatible with this requirement, it cautions against
allowing the requirement to degenerate into a “one hand washes the other”
or “favoritism” standard. This Article maintains that specific, ex ante
regulations of the sort commonly found in ethical codes and campaign
finance regulations provide a better way to limit corruption than bribery
laws, but it warns that even these regulations should not prohibit all
practices that may be the functional equivalent of bribery. This Article
concludes by speculating about whether the efforts of federal prosecutors to
reduce corruption over the past sixty years have given us better
government.
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I. THE CORRUPTION DILEMMA
The scholarship of Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig has reminded
us of the classic definition of corruption.1 Corruption in its classic sense
describes something that has become impure or perverted.2 In Aristotle’s
words, “The true forms of government . . . are those in which [rulers]
govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule
with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions.”3 New York Times
columnist Bob Herbert explains why our government fits the ancient
definition:
The corporate and financial elites threw astounding sums of money into
campaign contributions and high-priced lobbyists and think tanks and
media buys and anything else they could think of. They wined and dined
powerful leaders of both parties. They flew them on private jets and
wooed them with golf outings and lavish vacations and gave them high-

1. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 15–20, 230–47 (2011) [hereinafter LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST]; ZEPHYR
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS
UNITED 9, 38–39, 41 (2014) [hereinafter TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA]; Lawrence
Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1
(2014); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009);
Lawrence Lessig, “CORRUPTION,” ORIGINALLY., http://ocorruption.tumblr.com (“A blog
collecting every use of the term ‘corruption’ among the records of the Framers.”)
[http://perma.cc/K7L3-3WWJ].
2. See generally Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on Legality and Corruption, in
CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS 25 (Manuhuia Barcham et al. eds., 2012).
3. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 114 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1967)
(c. 350 B.C.E.).
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paying jobs as lobbyists the moment they left the government. All that
money was well spent. The investments paid off big time.4

In at least one sense, the practices Herbert decries are the functional
equivalent of bribery.5 Quid pro quo bribes produce decisions not in the
public interest—they corrupt—and unconditional contributions and gifts do
too.
Declaring that implicit agreements and understandings lie behind these
practices, however, would be too cynical. The problem is not that corrupt
agreements are left to winks and nods. Instead, with rare exceptions, there
are no agreements, express or implied. Campaign contributions and other
benefits are accompanied by hope but not by an understanding that a
recipient will provide anything in return. As Herbert says, the hope may
turn out to be justified often enough to make the contributions good
investments. Quid pro quo exchanges are rarely how corruption happens.
If a public official were to do nothing to aid one of his benefactors, the
benefactor usually would not say even to himself that the official had
broken an implicit promise.
When the goal is to root out Aristotelian corruption, the law of bribery,
extortion, and fraud looks profoundly under-inclusive. The push of
prosecutors, judges, journalists, and reformers to expand this law is easily
understood. The thesis of this Article, however, is that the push usually
should be resisted. America can better achieve James Madison’s wish “that
the national legislature be as uncorrupt as possible”6 through specific, ex
ante regulations—what Zephyr Teachout calls structural or prophylactic
These regulations include, in particular, campaign finance
rules.7
limitations of the sort today’s Supreme Court strikes down,8 gratuity
prohibitions, and ethical codes forbidding the creation of some conflicts of

4. Bob Herbert, Opinion, When Democracy Weakens, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/opinion/12herbert.html [http://perma.cc/4Z7D-G8F9].
5. Many people, including former President Jimmy Carter, former Governor Jesse
Ventura, and former lobbyist and prisoner Jack Abramoff, have described our campaign
finance system as one of legalized bribery. See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 8
(quoting Jack Abramoff) (“I was participating in a system of legalized bribery. All of it is
bribery, every bit of it.”); Editorial, The Line at the “Super PAC” Trough, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/opinion/sunday/the-line-at-the-super-pactrough.html (“This election year will be the moment when individual candidate super
PACs—a form of legalized bribery—become a truly toxic force in American politics.”)
[http://perma.cc/K4FE-RRYZ]; Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Calling America: Hello?
Hello? Hello? Hello?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/
opinion/sunday/friedman-calling-america-hello-hello-hello-hello.html (“[O]ur Congress has
become a forum for legalized bribery.”) [http://perma.cc/ZF2T-62LW]; Ray Henry, Jimmy
Carter: Unchecked Political Contributions Are “Legal Bribery”, HUFFINGTON POST (July
17, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-carter-bribery_n_3
611882.html [http://perma.cc/4TCY-2C5L]; Bruno J. Navarro, Jesse Ventura Likens Politics
to Bribery, CNBC (June 19, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47883494 [http://
perma.cc/42Y3-TABR].
6. James Madison, The Journal of the Constitutional Convention (June 23, 1787), in 3
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 261 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1902).
7. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 4, 284–87.
8. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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interest. Trying to block all functional equivalents of bribery even through
specific, ex ante regulations, however, would do more harm than good.
II. TWO DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY
This part describes two concepts of bribery, one focusing on making or
offering a gift with an improper state of mind (“intent to influence” bribery)
and the other on making or proposing an improper exchange (“illegal
contract” bribery). It examines the history of these concepts, explores their
implications, and argues that “intent to influence” has become an untenable
standard. The Supreme Court has sensibly interpreted statutes that on their
face seem to require only an intent to influence to require instead a quid pro
quo—a proposed or completed exchange of a thing of value for favorable
governmental action.
A. “Intent to Influence” Bribery
This section notes the origin of the “intent to influence” standard in an
English common law prohibition of improper gifts to judges and the
appearance of this standard in the federal government’s first general bribery
statute in 1853. It argues that, even if the standard once made sense, it is
now overbroad. Although the standard could be tamed by an appropriate
construction of the word “corruptly,” courts rarely take this adverb
seriously. This section also examines the awkward efforts of legislatures
and courts to apply the “intent to influence” standard to bribe-takers as well
as to the bribe-givers for whom it was initially devised.
1. The Basic Standard
On first reading, federal bribery statutes appear to make felons of
everyone who supplies the kind of benefits Herbert describes.9 So do the
bribery statutes of nearly one-third of the states. These statutes forbid
giving, offering, or promising anything of value to an official with intent to
influence an official act. Some of them, including the two principal federal
bribery statutes, add the word “corruptly”: they forbid corruptly offering a
benefit with intent to influence.10 Other “intent to influence” statutes,
however, leave this word out,11 and federal bribery statutes did not include
it until 1962.12 At least with the adverb “corruptly” set aside, “intent to
influence” statutes appear to make a criminal of every lobbyist who buys
lunch for a legislator and of every campaign contributor who hopes that his
contribution will make its recipient more sympathetic to his interests.
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (bribery); id. § 666 (federal program bribery);
FLA. STAT. § 838.015 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-210 (2013).
11. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:118 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-11-11 (West
2014); WIS. STAT. § 946.10 (2014).
12. Compare, e.g., An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Penal Laws of the United
States, Pub. L. No. 60-350, §§ 111–112, 117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1108–09, 1109–10 (1909), with
An Act to Strengthen the Criminal Laws Relating to Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interest,
Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 201, 76 Stat. 1119, 1119 (1962).
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The “intent to influence” statutes took their standard from the English
common law.13 Both this law and the earliest bribery statutes, however,
applied only to benefits provided to judges.14 Congress enacted its first
general prohibition of bribery in 1853—a time when Aristotelian ideals of
impartiality and public service were taken so seriously that paid lobbying
was considered contrary to public policy and sometimes made a crime.15
Borrowing language that initially applied only to the corruption of judges,16
the 1853 statute forbade both “bribes” and “presents” when they were given
“with intent to influence” federal officials.17 Congress no doubt meant
these words just the way they sound.
Some courts still take the words “intent to influence” literally. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, denied a defendant’s request for an instruction that
Louisiana’s “intent to influence” statute did not forbid “gifts made for
customary business reasons.”18 Giving such an instruction, the court said,
“would be a rank misapplication of the Louisiana bribery law. Customary
business practices could embrace all sorts of extravagant favors intended to
influence important business decisions.”19
2. The Adverb
The Louisiana bribery statute construed by the Fifth Circuit did not
include the word “corruptly,” and perhaps the court would have reached a
different result if it had. A statute that forbids corruptly giving a benefit
with intent to influence seems to acknowledge that not all benefits given
with intent to influence are improper. Perhaps the word “corruptly” is
crucial, and perhaps it does most of the work. This fudgy adverb might
prevent “intent to influence” statutes from sweeping into their net the

13. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 117–18.
14. See id. at 103–04, 111. The first federal bribery statute forbade giving any money
“or any other bribe, present or reward . . . to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment or
decree of any judge or judges of the United States.” An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes against the United States (Act of Apr. 30, 1790), ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (1790).
By 1798, a federal statute forbade bribing a federal “Judge, an Officer of the Customs, or an
Officer of the Excise.” United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 390, 28 F. Cas. 774,
777 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798). Whether federal courts could convict people not covered by this
statute of common law bribery was disputed. See id. In England, when officials other than
judges took bribes, the common law could convict them of extortion; a bribe-giver, however,
could not be convicted of this crime. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between
Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV 815,
842, 847 (1988).
15. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 144–73. At least one
court also held that political logrolling could be prosecuted as a common law misdemeanor.
The court said that logrolling violated an official’s duty “to vote in reference only to the
merits.” Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 460, 463 (1825).
16. See Act of April 30, 1790 § 21.
17. An Act to prevent Frauds upon the Treasury of the United States (Act of Feb. 26,
1853), ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171, 171 (1853).
18. United States v. L’Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 808 (5th Cir. 1980).
19. Id. A federal prosecutor could charge a violation of the Louisiana statute because
bribery in violation of state law is a predicate offense under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2012).
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lobbyist’s lunch, other routine entertainment, and many campaign
contributions.
When a federal statute uses a word that had an established meaning at
common law, courts presume that Congress meant the word to retain this
meaning.20 Common law extortion (which included accepting but not
giving bribes21) required a “corrupt” intent. The English courts, however,
did not use the word in the same way Aristotle (or his translators and
interpreters) did.
From the thirteenth through the late eighteenth centuries, officials in
England were entitled to collect statutory dues and customary fees for
services, and the line between legitimate fee collection and extortion was
sometimes unclear.22 The courts declared that officials acted corruptly only
when they realized they were not entitled to the fees they collected.23
“Corruptly” meant deliberately acting in violation of positive law or
established norms of legitimate official conduct.
Judge Kozinski’s reading of the word “corruptly” in a federal bribery
statute echoed the common law.24 In a dissenting opinion in the Ninth
Circuit, he wrote, “Conduct is corrupt if it’s an improper way for a public
official to benefit from his job. But what’s improper turns on many
different factors, such as tradition, context and current attitudes about
legitimate rewards for particular officeholders.”25 Kozinski added that
corruption “can’t be easily captured in a single formula, as it varies too
much from situation to situation.”26
Federal juries never hear an explanation of the word “corruptly” like
Judge Kozinski’s. Many courts see the word as doing no work at all. They
have made it redundant by declaring that a person acts corruptly whenever
his conduct and mental state establish the other elements of bribery. The
Second Circuit, for example, appeared to make felons of all lunch-buying
lobbyists when it approved the following instruction: “A person acts
corruptly . . . when he gives or offers to give something of value intending
to influence . . . a government agent in connection with his official
duties.”27 The Seventh Circuit held that omitting the word “corruptly” from
20. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999).
21. See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 821 (“Bribery behavior was routinely punished as
common law extortion.”). The Supreme Court relied on Lindgren’s scholarship when it held
that the Hobbs Act, a federal extortion statute, punishes bribery. See Evans v. United States,
504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992). But see id. at 280–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the
merits of [Lindgren’s] argument as a description of early English common law, it is beside
the point here—the critical inquiry for our purposes is the American understanding of the
crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.”).
22. See Jeremy N. Gayed, Note, “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an
Essential Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2003).
23. See e.g., Rex v. Vaughan (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 308 [310] (KB) (emphasizing the
defendant’s awareness that he had engaged in an “unjustifiable transaction”).
24. United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
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jury instructions altogether was not plain error because nothing in the 1962
addition of the word “corrupt” enlarged the meaning of “intent” as an
essential element of the offense.28
Courts that do not make the word “corruptly” redundant typically define
it in language that is just as fudgy, open-ended, and evaluative as the term
itself. They use the words “improper,” “wrongful,” “evil,” and “bad.”
They say that corruption refers to an “improper motive or purpose,”29 an
“intent to obtain an improper advantage for oneself or someone else,”30 a
“wrongful or dishonest intent,”31 a “bad purpose or evil motive,”32 or a
“wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage.”33
Even on Judge Kozinski’s interpretation, the word “corruptly” is vague.34
“Intent to influence” statutes seem to require normative evaluation as well
as fact-finding and mind-reading.35 These statutes are relics of a time when
crimes were defined far less precisely than they usually are today, when
juries rather than plea-bargaining prosecutors resolved criminal cases, and
when Americans had extraordinary faith in the ability of juries to determine
whether defendants deserved punishment.36
3. The Bribe-Taker’s Mental State
“Intent to influence” describes the mental state of someone who gives a
bribe, but courts and legislatures have used other language to describe the
28. United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing United States
v. Isa, 452 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1971)). But see Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1542–45
(11th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the court would have held unconstitutional a Georgia statute
that prohibits giving campaign contributions with intent to influence if the state courts had
not read into this statute a requirement that the contributions be given “corruptly”).
29. See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting jury
instruction).
30. United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting United
States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
31. Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 1996).
32. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir. 2007).
33. United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 805 n.13 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting CAL. PENAL
CODE § 7(3) (West 2014)). Courts also say that acting corruptly means acting “with the
purpose, at least in part, of accomplishing either an unlawful end result, or a lawful end
result by some unlawful method or means.” United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 172 (2d
Cir. 1995). Someone must have worked hard to create this ponderous way of saying that the
accused must have intended to do something unlawful.
34. In fact, the D.C. Circuit held the word too vague to give fair notice to a defendant
accused, not of giving a bribe, but of corruptly influencing Congress by lying to a
congressional committee. The court observed that many people attempt to influence
Congress and that they are entitled to more notice of the line between proper and improper
conduct than the word “corruptly” supplies. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 384–
86 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
35. It is sometimes said that the criminal law cares about an actor’s intention but not his
motive. It’s enough, for example, that a defendant charged with homicide meant to kill; it
doesn’t matter why he did it. But “intent to influence” statutes focus on motive. It isn’t
sufficient that a defendant deliberately gave a thing of value to a public official; someone
must figure out why he did it.
36. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39, 140–41
(2011); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 902–11 (1994).
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mental state of the person who takes it. Finding an appropriate standard has
not been easy.
Instructions sometimes tell juries that the alleged bribe-taker’s
knowledge of the donor’s intent to influence is enough.37 These
instructions seem to make a bribe-taker of every official who allows a
lobbyist to buy him lunch. If the official is awake, he surely must realize
that the lobbyist intends to influence him. The Second Circuit, however,
reversed a conviction because the trial court gave an instruction of this
sort.38 The court quoted the language of the applicable statute, which
focused on the defendant’s own motives rather than his knowledge of the
other guy’s: “[A] recipient’s knowledge of a donor’s intent to influence is
insufficient to support conviction. The recipient must take the proffered
thing of value ‘intending to be influenced.’”39
In fact, few bribe-takers want to be influenced. What a bribe-taker wants
is a bribe, and he may regret that being influenced is the only way to get it.
Intending to be influenced probably means knowing that one will be
influenced.
Whether the word “intent” refers to purpose or knowledge, the statutory
language noted by the Second Circuit seems to validate two implausible
defenses: (1) “I did not intend to be influenced because I never meant to
keep my promise.” And (2) “I did not intend to be influenced because I
already had made up my mind. I simply agreed to do what I would have
done anyway.”40 A defendant who offered the first defense—“I never

37. See, e.g., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 146
(2012), https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf (“The
government also does not need to prove that the defendant . . . intended to be influenced. It
is sufficient if the defendant knew that the thing of value was offered with the intent to
influence official action.”) [http://perma.cc/KM8H-K95A]; McCormick v. United States,
500 U.S. 257, 261 n.4 (1991) (noting an instruction that the jury must be “convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the payment . . . was made . . . with the expectation that such
payment would influence [the defendant’s] official conduct, and with the knowledge on the
part of the defendant that they were paid to him with that expectation”); United States v.
Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting the trial court’s instruction that the receipt
of a personal or financial benefit “violates the law only if the benefit was received with the
public official’s understanding that it was given to influence his decision-making”); United
States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting the trial court’s instruction that
“[t]he crime [of bribery] is completed when the property or personal advantage is accepted
by the public employee knowing it was offered with the intent that he act favorably to the
person offering the property or personal advantage when necessary”).
38. United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2006).
39. Id. at 213 n.5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
40. The Seventh Circuit recently approved the “I never meant to keep my promise”
defense. See United States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 882–84 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook,
J.) (holding that officials who purport to take bribes but do not mean to keep their promises
cannot be convicted of either bribery or honest-services fraud). The Seventh Circuit did not
mention its earlier decision upholding the bribery conviction of an official who took money
in exchange for doing something that, unbeknownst to the bribe-giver, the official already
had done. This official’s unsuccessful argument was that “one cannot be influenced to do
what has already been done.” United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1978).
The Seventh Circuit also ignored a Second Circuit decision repudiating the “I never meant to
keep my promise” defense. See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 841 (2d Cir. 1982)
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meant to keep my promise”—might be convicted of defrauding the bribegiver,41 but a defendant who offered the second—“I’d already made up my
mind”—would have delivered the action he promised and would not have
deceived anyone. Under federal law, both defendants could be convicted of
receiving an improper gratuity.42
Certainly U Po Kyin, George Orwell’s fictional Sub-Division Magistrate
of Kyauktada in Upper Burma, could not be convicted of bribery if 18
U.S.C. § 666, an “intent to be influenced” federal bribery statute, were
taken literally.43 Kyin always took bribes from both sides to ensure that he
would decide the cases before him on strictly legal grounds.44 Kyin did not
intend to be influenced, did not know that he would be influenced, and was
not in fact influenced.45
Similarly, Sir Francis Bacon, whom the House of Lords convicted of
bribery in 1621, might not be convicted if he were charged with bribery
today under § 666. Bacon, the Lord Chancellor of England (as well as a
path-breaking philosopher and inventor of modern science), claimed that he
never allowed any of the bribes allegedly given by litigants to influence
him. In fact, he said, he often ruled against the alleged bribe-givers.46
(Newman, J.) (“‘[B]eing influenced’ does not describe the Congressman’s true intent, it
describes the intention he conveys to the briber in exchange for the bribe.”).
41. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896) (holding that false promises
as well as false representations of fact can justify federal mail fraud convictions).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 666 forbids both corruptly accepting a thing of value intending to be
influenced and corruptly accepting a thing of value intending to be rewarded. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B). Several federal courts of appeals have concluded that, because the statute
uses the word “reward,” it proscribes gratuities as well as bribes. See, e.g., United States v.
Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 636–37 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Zimmerman, 509 F.3d 920,
927 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (declaring
that bribes and gratuities “are both illegal under different parts of the statute”). The First
Circuit, however, recently held that § 666 does not punish gratuities, and the Fourth Circuit
earlier indicated without deciding that it took the same view. See United States v. Fernandez,
722 F.3d 1, 6, 19–26 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C. § 201, the statute most commonly used to prosecute federal officials for
bribe taking, proscribes gratuities in a subsection other than the one proscribing bribes. It
sets the maximum term of imprisonment for accepting a bribe at fifteen years and the
maximum for accepting a gratuity at two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribes); id. § 201(c)
(gratuities). Prosecutors generally use 18 U.S.C. § 666, the “federal program bribery”
statute, to prosecute state and local officials. If § 666 punishes gratuities, it does so in the
same section that outlaws bribery, and it sets the maximum penalty for both crimes at ten
years. If § 666 reaches gratuities, the statute departs from the common pattern of treating
bribery as a more serious crime than taking gratuities. Moreover, the federal government
punishes state and local officials for accepting gratuities five times more severely than it
punishes federal officials for doing the same thing. See generally George D. Brown, Stealth
Statute—Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 247, 308–11 (1998).
43. See GEORGE ORWELL, BURMESE DAYS 7 (1934).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See PEREZ ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 22 (1998). Seeking King James I’s
intervention while his case was pending, Bacon wrote the King that he never had a “bribe or
reward in my eye or thought when I pronounced any sentence or order.” JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., BRIBES 352 (1984). Some modern observers maintain that Bacon was bum-rapped by
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The other major federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), is slightly
less troublesome than § 666. It says that a public official may not corruptly
demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept anything of
value in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act.47
An official might agree to accept a thing of value in return for being
influenced even if he never intended to be influenced. Perhaps this official
could be convicted under § 201(b) even if he could not be convicted under
§ 666. Like an official charged with violating § 666, however, an official
charged with violating § 201(b) could defend by saying, “I agreed to vote in
favor of the Widget Subsidies Act in return for cash, but I never agreed to
be influenced. I had decided to support widget subsidies long before I took
the money.”
B. “Illegal Contract” Bribery
Someone who contributes to an official’s reelection campaign or gives
the official’s daughter a nice wedding present may hope to curry the
official’s favor. This conduct may indeed influence the official, and critics
may call it the functional equivalent of bribery. Few, however, would
describe this conduct as bribery itself. It certainly is not the sort of behavior
that should expose someone to imprisonment for ten, fifteen, or twenty
years.48 The Seventh Circuit has commented, “Vague expectations of some
future benefit should not be sufficient to make a payment a bribe.”49 As the
word is most commonly used today, “bribery” probably denotes an actual
or contemplated exchange of something of value for favorable
governmental action, not simply a unilateral act intended to make favorable
governmental action more likely.
In 1962, a commentary to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code (MPC) declared that the code’s definition of bribery would preclude
“application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in the
mere hope of influence.”50 The MPC defines bribery as offering, giving,
soliciting, or accepting a pecuniary benefit as “consideration” for an official
act.51 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said of a Texas bribery
statute modeled on this provision,52 the MPC “requir[es] a bilateral

Sir Edward Coke and other political opponents, but Noonan, who provides a full account of
his case, makes clear that he was not. See id. at 334–65.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
48. The maximum penalty for federal program bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666 is ten
years, and the maximum penalty for bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) is fifteen years.
Bribery also can be prosecuted as honest-services fraud, for which the maximum penalty is
usually twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; infra Part III.A.
49. United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 note on status of section (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Official Draft 1962). The MPC reporters initially proposed an “intent to influence” statute,
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.10 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958), but
criticism at the May 1958 meeting of the American Law Institute led them to revise their
draft, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 note on status of section, supra.
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
52. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (West 2012).
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arrangement—in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as
consideration for the performance of an official function.”53
The words “bilateral arrangement” in the Texas court’s formulation
might be misleading. Like “intent to influence” bribery, “illegal contract”
bribery can be committed by an individual acting alone. The crime includes
offers and solicitations, and it also includes transactions in which one party
merely feigns agreement. An offender, however, must seek a bargain with
another person.54 How the other person responds does not matter; by
including offers and solicitations, every “illegal contract” bribery statute
punishes attempted as well as completed exchanges. More than two-thirds
of the states have followed the MPC’s lead and now embrace the “illegal
contract” concept of bribery.55
53. McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
In Garrett v. McCotter, 807 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit noted “that
the Texas Legislature intentionally replaced ‘with intent to influence’ with ‘any benefit as
consideration for’ in order to avoid ‘application of the bribery sanction to situations where
gifts are given in mere hope of influence.’” Id. at 485. Because this “change in language was
intended to stiffen the requirements for a bribery conviction,” an indictment that described
the crime as giving a benefit with intent to influence did not charge an offense under Texas
law. Id.
54. At least when the alleged bribe consists of something other than a campaign
contribution, see infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text, the agreement need not be
express. In United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), for example, an official
who heard challenges to tax assessments accepted payments from lawyers who practiced
before him. The payments included a $4000 “referral fee” although the official provided no
referral, $500 in cash passed in a white envelope under the table at a restaurant, and another
$1000 passed in the men’s room of a private club. Id. at 599–600.
“[U]nlike some of [his] predecessors,” the Seventh Circuit reported, the defendant in
Gorny “did not receive payments based on the outcome of any specific case nor was the
amount he received based on a percentage of the reduction of an assessment.” Id. at 599. His
benefactors, however, “enjoyed an unusually high rate of success in their practice before the
Board.” Id. at 600. One of them won 80 percent of his cases and another 93 percent
although the average rate of success was only 35 percent. Id.
The defendant in Gorny apparently made no promises out loud, and what cases he
would fix remained unspecified. See id. Everyone understood what the payments were for,
however, and the defendant provided it by ruling in favor of his benefactors at a high rate. Id.
A jury easily could have inferred that, at the time he accepted each payment, the defendant
agreed implicitly to provide a governmental benefit in return.
Of course, the line between currying favor and seeking an implicit agreement is
fuzzy. One might ask whether the alleged bribe-giver legitimately could have felt cheated
rather than simply disappointed if the alleged bribe-taker had never done anything for him.
Could the donor plausibly have said to the recipient, “We never spelled it out, but we did
have an understanding”?
55. See United States v. Biaggi, 674 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing thirty-eight
state statutes). At least one state has approved an “illegal contract” definition of bribery for
bribe-takers and an “intent to influence” definition for bribe-givers. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.118 (West 2014) (making it a crime to accept a benefit “under an agreement, or
with an understanding that [the accepting official’s] vote, opinion or judgment shall be given
in any particular manner, or upon a particular side of any question”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.117 (making it a crime to corruptly give any valuable thing with the purpose of
influencing official action). Zephyr Teachout’s statement that “most states have not adopted
a quid pro quo requirement for any of their bribery laws” seems correct only in the sense that
most states do not use the Latin words. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note
1, at 240. Requiring that a benefit be offered or accepted as “consideration” for favorable
governmental action is no different from requiring a quid pro quo.
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The “illegal contract” concept of bribery usually sweeps less broadly than
the “intent to influence” concept. It poses no threat to a campaign
contributor who hopes simply to curry favor or to someone who picks up a
lunch check in the hope that doing so will generate goodwill. Occasionally,
however, the “illegal contract” concept sweeps more broadly. Under this
standard, an official who accepts a thing of value in exchange for a promise
to do the donor’s bidding cannot escape conviction simply because he
already had decided to take the action sought. And unlike the “intent to
influence” concept, the “illegal contract” concept applies to bribe-givers
and bribe-takers equally.
C. The Federal Amalgam
Federal bribery statutes use the words “intent to influence,”56 but the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of these words has transformed them. With
a shoehorn and a shove, the Court has fit the “illegal contract” concept of
bribery into these “intent to influence” statutes. The Court wrote in United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,57 “Bribery requires intent ‘to influence’ an
official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act . . . . In other words, for
bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act.”58
“Intent to influence” and “exchange” are not different words for the same
thing. Some of the 179 people who “bundled” more than $500,000 apiece
for President Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign59 undoubtedly hoped to
influence governmental action—perhaps by increasing the likelihood of
their own appointment as ambassadors.60 One would be surprised,
however, to learn of any quid pro quo or corrupt understanding at the time
they gave their support. As courts have recognized, giving something with
a “generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the
donor” is not a bribe.61
The Supreme Court might better have grounded its quid pro quo
requirement on the word “corruptly.” Norms have changed since Congress
enacted its first general bribery statute in 1853,62 and many benefits
intended to influence are not seen as improper today. Before the Court
56. See supra Part II.A.
57. 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
58. Id. at 404–05.
59. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, MEET THE BUNDLERS BEHIND THE MONEY
(2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.opensecrets.org/pres12/img/bundlers.png [http://
perma.cc/DZN6-NXFW]. President Obama’s opponent, Governor Romney, did not reveal
how many people “bundled” more than $500,000 for his campaign. Id. No law required him
to do so. Id.
60. See Max Fisher, This Very Telling Map Shows Which U.S. Ambassadors Were
Campaign Bundlers, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/10/this-very-telling-map-shows-which-u-s-ambassadorswere-campaign-bundlers/ (noting that “23 current U.S. ambassadors or ambassadorial
nominees . . . were also major campaign-donation bundlers”) [http://perma.cc/853V-NM47].
61. United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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declared that “intent to influence” and “quid pro quo” meant the same thing,
a few lower courts had in fact found a quid pro quo requirement in the word
“corruptly.”63
Under the Court’s decisions, a quid pro quo usually can be implied rather
than express. In McCormick v. United States,64 however, the Court held
that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when “the
payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an official act.”65 Although the
Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme Court
decision modified McCormick,66 at least six other courts of appeals insist
that an explicit agreement remains necessary.67
McCormick did not rest its requirement of an “explicit” quid pro quo on
the language of the statute.68 The case arose under an extortion statute, the
Hobbs Act, which federal courts had construed to reach bribe taking
although its language simply forbade obtaining property “under color of
official right.”69 Without parsing this language, the Court emphasized the
danger of allowing prosecutors and jurors to infer corrupt bargains from the
conduct of campaign contributors and elected officials.70 It said that
Congress would be required to speak clearly if it wished to demand less
than an explicit agreement:
To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has
long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by
63. See United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts
equate ‘corrupt intent’ with the intent to engage in a relatively specific quid pro quo.”);
United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1991) (declaring that the “corrupt
intent” required by § 201 is an intent “to receive some benefit in return for the payments”);
United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978) (declaring that the term “corrupt
intent” incorporates an element of quid pro quo bribery and adding that the quid pro quo
element “distinguishes the heightened criminal intent requisite under the bribery sections of
[§ 201] from the simple mens rea required for violation of the gratuity sections”).
64. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
65. Id. at 273. The trial court had given an “intent to influence” instruction. Id. at 265.
The Supreme Court reversed because, at least in a case involving campaign contributions,
this sort of instruction is erroneous. Id. at 267.
66. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)).
67. See United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 253–54, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 515–19 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey,
556 F.3d 923, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142–43 (2d
Cir. 2007); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 256–61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001). The language of United States v. Terry, 707
F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2013), is inconsistent with McCormick (and with the Third Circuit’s
earlier decision in Antico), but the court seemed not to notice the relevant passage of
McCormick. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. Similarly, United States v. Blagojevich, 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 12563 (7th Cir. July 21, 2015) (Easterbrook, J.), insisted that McCormick
does not require an explicit quid pro quo, id. at 16–17, but it ignored both the language of
McCormick and Seventh Circuit precedent.
68. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that the statute
“contains not even a colorable allusion to . . . quid pro quos”).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(2) (2012).
70. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272–73.
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private contributions. . . . It would require statutory language more
explicit than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion.71

Although the Court embraced the “illegal contract” concept of bribery in
1991, pattern jury instructions in most circuits continue to recite the
language of federal bribery statutes without elaboration. Juries rarely hear
the words “quid pro quo” or the words “express,” “implied,” or
“agreement.” They hear only that bribe-givers and bribe-takers must intend
to influence or to be influenced.72 Many defense attorneys are so inept that
they fail to complain about these instructions. Especially from the
perspective of the jury box, the federal law of bribery is a muddle.
III. EFFORTS TO BEND, BREAK, OR CIRCUMVENT
THE QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT
Because federal bribery statutes as construed by the Supreme Court fall
far short of proscribing every functional equivalent of bribery, prosecutors,
lower court judges, legislators, and other corruption fighters look for ways
to stretch or get around them. The Court sometimes seems to be engaged in
a tug-of-war with everyone else, and this part describes some of the backand-forth hauling.
71. Id. Justice Thomas later observed, “We . . . imposed [the quid pro quo requirement]
to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in American political
life.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 286 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
No court seems to have addressed directly the common situation in which a
benefactor has given both campaign contributions and other things of value to an official and
then has gained something of value from one or more of this official’s actions. Permitting a
jury to infer an unexpressed agreement from this hybrid package surely would be
inconsistent with McCormick. Perhaps, however, evidence of the campaign contributions
could be admitted on the theory that they provide evidence of the contributor’s intent and
bear on whether his other gifts were bribes. Whether the campaign contributions would in
fact indicate that an implicit agreement accompanied the other benefits is problematic,
however, and even if they did, inviting jurors to draw an adverse inference from the exercise
of a First Amendment right might improperly “chill” the exercise of this right. A prosecutor
who cannot prove an express agreement and who wishes to insulate a bribery conviction
from later attack probably should present no evidence of campaign contributions at all.
72. See, e.g., FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 123–26,
205–06 (2012), http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/ [http://perma.cc/WC4WANBH]; MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 194–98, 209–10, http://juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/criminal_
instructions.htm [http://perma.cc/WM53-8SWL]; ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 121, 189–90 (2010), http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstruction.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJ3CWD8A]. But see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 6.18.201B1 (2004), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chap%206%
20Bribery.pdf (requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted “corruptly with the intent to
influence an official act, that is[,] . . . to give [a specified thing of value] in exchange for an
official act”) [http://perma.cc/DZ9B-CZQX]. Although the Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury
instructions omit any reference to an exchange or quid pro quo when bribery is charged
under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) or 18 U.S.C. § 666, see PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 145–46, 205–10 (2012), https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_
Jury_Instr/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9MF-CTY8], they describe the
crime differently when the government charges bribery as a form of honest-services fraud.
Then the crime becomes accepting something of value in exchange for the promise or
performance of an official act. See id. at 403.
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A. Honest-Services Fraud
Particularly in the 1970s, prosecutors persuaded the lower federal courts
that the federal mail fraud statute forbade schemes to deprive the public of
“the intangible right of honest services.”73 In 1987, however, the Court
held that this statute outlawed depriving people of property, not an illdefined intangible right of honest services.74
The Department of Justice (DOJ) then complained to Congress that the
Court had deprived it of an important tool in its battle against corruption.75
Congress responded by enacting a statute that read in full, “For the purposes
of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”76
This statute enabled lower federal court judges, like the priests of ancient
Delphi, to explicate language ordinary mortals could not understand.77 In
United States v. Sawyer78 and United States v. Woodward,79 for example,
the First Circuit upheld the convictions of a legislator and a lobbyist who
had lavishly entertained the legislator.80 The well-entertained legislator had
supported almost all of the lobbyist’s agenda.81 After noting that bribery
was an established category of honest-services fraud, the court announced
that it would expand this category “from quid pro quo bribery, to include a
more generalized pattern of gratuities to coax ‘ongoing favorable official
action.’”82 It said that juries should be instructed that it is lawful for
lobbyists to entertain legislators to cultivate “business or political
friendship” but felonious for them to do so “to cause the recipient to alter
her official acts.”83 The court observed that the benefits it made criminal

73. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362–64 & nn.1–3 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
74. See id. at 356 (majority opinion).
75. See Mail Fraud: Hearing on H.R. 3089 and H.R. 3050 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 8–11 (1988) (statement
of John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
77. A panel of the Second Circuit held the honest-services statute too vague to give fair
notice to defendants. See United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002). But the en
banc Second Circuit set this ruling aside. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2003). Other courts also rejected vagueness challenges to the statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081,
1109 n.29 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 803 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 370–71 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d
769, 776–77 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568–69 (11th Cir. 1995). Most federal judges
apparently believed they could figure out what the statute meant.
78. 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
79. 149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 52–54.
81. Id. at 53.
82. Id. at 55 (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 730).
83. Id. (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 741). If you wish to guffaw at the court’s purported
distinction, be my guest.
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“may not be very different, except in degree, from routine cultivation of
friendship in a lobbying context.”84
The First Circuit grounded its rulings in Sawyer and Woodward on the
legislator’s failure to disclose the conflict of interest created by his
relationship with the lobbyist:
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material information
to the public employer. When an official fails to disclose a personal
interest in a matter over which she has decision-making power, the public
is deprived of its right either to disinterested decision making itself or, as
the case may be, to full disclosure as to the official’s potential
motivation.85

Punishing undisclosed conflicts of interest may sound like a fine idea—
as long as the idea goes by fast. A conflicting interest, however, is any
interest that might divert an official from faithful service to the public.
When the official’s decision will benefit a member of his family, he has a
conflict of interest. When his decision will benefit a business partner or
good friend, he again has a conflict. When his decision will benefit an
important political supporter, he has a conflict. When his decision will
benefit a lobbyist who has taken him on golf outings, he once more has a
conflict. When this official’s action will benefit anyone at all who has done
any favor for which he is grateful, he has a conflict of interest. Conflicts
are ubiquitous.86
No official could compile a list of all his conflicts, and if he could, he
would not know where to post it. How does one go about disclosing a
conflict of interest to a disembodied public employer? Would a “my
conflicts” section on the official’s Facebook page be sufficient? When no
official ever has or ever could disclose every conflict, criminalizing
undisclosed conflicts looks like a way to enable prosecutors to pick their
targets.87
The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning or the constitutionality
of the honest-services statute until twenty-two years after its enactment.
Then, in 2010, in Skilling v. United States,88 three justices declared in a
concurring opinion that they would hold the statute unconstitutionally

84. Id. (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 741).
85. Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724 (citations omitted).
86. Show me a public official without conflicts of interest, and I will show you an
official without any social life, work life, family life, religious life, or political life.
87. Cf. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (“The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external
disclosure standard, places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may be
guided by their own political motivations [and] might also feel political pressure to pursue
certain state or local officials.”).
A court or legislature can reduce the reach of a prohibition of undisclosed conflicts
by requiring that an official’s non-disclosure violate a federal, state, or local reporting
requirement. This limitation, however, poses problems of its own. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v.
United States, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 501, 513–17 (2014).
88. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
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vague,89 and the remaining justices acknowledged that the defendant’s
“vagueness challenge has force.”90 The majority concluded, however, that
the statute could be saved by confining it to a “solid core” that every lower
court had recognized.91 “[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass
conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and
kickbacks,” the Court said.92 “[N]o other misconduct falls within [the
statute’s] province.”93 The Court not only rejected the government’s
argument that the statute criminalized failing to disclose a conflict of
interest but also warned Congress that a statute embracing this standard
might be held unconstitutional.94
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
promptly declared that the Court had “sided with an Enron executive who
had been convicted of fraud” and “undermined Congressional efforts to
protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests.”95 In 2012, the
Senate approved without noticeable opposition a Leahy-sponsored proposal
to restore twenty-year penalties for some undisclosed conflicts of interest.96
The House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved this proposal as
well,97 but the majority leader of the House never brought it to a vote.98
Because Congress failed to enact the Leahy proposal, the post-Skilling
honest-services statute remains compatible with the Court’s quid pro quo
requirement, at least for now. The Supreme Court may be winning the tugof-war.
B. “Stream of Benefits” or “Course of Conduct” Bribery
In United States v. Kemp,99 the Third Circuit upheld a jury instruction
declaring, “[W]here there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor
a public official, . . . it need not be shown that any specific benefit was
given in exchange for a specific official act.”100 In United States v.
Kincaid-Chauncey,101 the Ninth Circuit declared that accepting a “retainer”
with “the understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government
89. See id. at 415 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
90. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 407.
92. Id. at 411.
93. Id. at 412.
94. See id. at 411 n.44.
95. Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court’s
Skilling Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg64789/pdf/
CHRG-111shrg64789.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZD7U-LJST].
96. See Alschuler, supra note 87, at 506.
97. See Clean Up Government Act of 2011, H.R. REP. NO. 112-688 (2012), http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt688/html/CRPT-112hrpt688.htm [http://perma.cc/RG9AS7QF].
98. See Seung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Under Fire for STOCK Act Tweaks, POLITICO
(Feb. 8, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72624.html [http://
perma.cc/L67Q-PWBK].
99. 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007).
100. Id. at 281.
101. 556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009).
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official will do whatever is asked” is bribery.102 In United States v.
Whitfield,103 the Fifth Circuit said, “[A] particular, specified act need not be
identified at the time of payment to satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, so
long as the payor and payee agreed upon a specific type of action to be
taken in the future.”104 In United States v. Jennings,105 the Fourth Circuit
observed, “[T]he intended exchange in bribery can be ‘this for these’ or
‘these for these,’ not just ‘this for that.’”106 And in United States v.
Ganim,107 the Second Circuit wrote, “[S]o long as the jury finds that an
official accepted gifts in exchange for a promise to perform official acts for
the giver, it need not find that the specific act to be performed was
identified at the time of the promise.”108
These declarations seem inconsistent with two descriptions of bribery by
the Supreme Court. The Court wrote in Evans v. United States,109 “[T]he
offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment
in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts.”110 It added in
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers that, at least under 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b), a bribe must be given “for or because of some particular official
act.”111 These statements have led bribery defendants to argue that the
government failed to identify any “particular official act” or “specific
official act” they agreed to perform. Even if they agreed in general terms to
do something helpful for their benefactors, the “something” remained
unspecified.
As best I can tell, these defendants have never been successful.112 For
them, the Court’s statements have been a snare and a delusion. In bribery
as in baseball, there appears to be no good reason why a transaction may
not include a player to be named later. If a public official named Genie
were to agree to grant three wishes in exchange for a deposit to her Cayman
Islands bank account, she surely should be convicted of bribery. Moreover,
an agreement to provide unspecified benefits need not be express. A

102. Id. at 943 n.15.
103. 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009).
104. Id. at 350.
105. 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 1014.
107. 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007).
108. Id. at 147; see also United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 152–53 (1st Cir.
2013); United States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bryant,
655 F.3d 232, 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2011).
109. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
110. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
111. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 405–06 (1999) (emphasis
added); see also McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (declaring that
campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when an official has made an “explicit
promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to perform an official act”).
112. In addition to the court of appeals decisions cited above in notes 99–108, see United
States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1186–91 (11th Cir. 2010), United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d
513, 519–22 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir.
1997).
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corrupt agreement sometimes can be inferred simply from the regular flow
of benefits in both directions.113
The principal danger of the “stream of benefits” concept of bribery is
nearly the opposite of the one defendants have suggested. It is not that
prosecutors and juries may fail to identify precisely the action a public
official agreed to perform; it is that they may fail to identify any benefit an
official accepted in exchange for a promise of official action. Although the
“stream of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with the quid pro quo
requirement, it invites slippage from this requirement to a “one hand
washes the other” or “favoritism” standard.
Every definition of bribery looks to the moment a benefit is received.114
Bribery can be committed before this moment—the crime includes offers
and solicitations—but it cannot be committed after. A payment cannot
become a bribe retrospectively—not even when its recipient later acts to
benefit its donor, not even when the recipient is motivated in whole or in
part by gratitude to the donor, and not even when the recipient hopes to
encourage further favors. As Justice Stevens wrote in a dissenting opinion,
“When petitioner took the money, he was either guilty or not guilty.”115
Words and actions that follow the receipt of a benefit may supply evidence
of what the donor and recipient intended when it was received, but they
cannot transform a benefit that was lawful at that time into a bribe.
Some bribery statutes proscribe giving or accepting benefits with intent
Others proscribe giving or accepting benefits as
to influence.116
“consideration” for official acts.117 Under either definition, favoritism
following the receipt of a benefit is not bribery, cronyism is not bribery,
“steering” contracts is not bribery, and “one hand washes the other” is not
bribery. These things are not good government. They are corrupt in the
classic Aristotelian sense of the word. They sometimes may be the result of
bribery and sometimes may evidence bribery. But they are not bribery. If
an official were subject to imprisonment whenever a jury could be
persuaded that he had acted deliberately to benefit someone who once did a
favor for him, only a fool would take the job. The circumstances must
warrant an inference that, at the time the official accepted one or more of
the benefits in the stream, he agreed at least implicitly to provide something
in return.
The dangers of the watery metaphor are illustrated by a case I lost, that of
former Illinois governor George H. Ryan.118 The jury in Ryan’s case was
directed to convict him if he failed to disclose a conflict of interest, but after
the Supreme Court held in Skilling that failing to disclose a conflict of
113. A very clear illustration is United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984),
described in note 54 above.
114. See generally supra Part II.
115. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Evans, 504 U.S. at
268 (“[T]he offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in
return for his agreement to perform specific official acts.”).
116. See supra Part II.A.
117. See supra Part II.B.
118. Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
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interest was no crime,119 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the jury must
have convicted him of taking bribes.120 The court focused particularly on
the award of a government contract to a lobbying client of codefendant
Lawrence Warner, a political associate and family friend who had done
favors for Ryan and members of his family.121 The court quoted and
approved the district court’s conclusion that Ryan’s reason for approving
the contract must have been either to promote effective law enforcement, as
he claimed, or else
to compensate Warner for the stream of benefits he provided, as the
Government urged.
The jury rejected the good faith motive.
Accordingly, the jury could only have convicted him on this count if it
believed that his conduct was a response to the stream of
benefits. . . . The court concludes that the jury must have found Ryan
accepted gifts from Warner with the intent to influence his actions.122

The court spoke of “compensat[ing] Warner for the stream of benefits”
and of “accept[ing] gifts from Warner with the intent to influence [Ryan’s]
actions” as though they were the same thing.123 But the gifts came at an
earlier point than the “compensation.”124 These gifts might have been
unconditional and legitimate even if they inspired gratitude and did prompt
By equating subsequent favoritism for a
later “compensation.”125
benefactor with bribery, the court concluded that the jury must have found
bribery.126 Its analysis placed every public official at risk.127
IV. WHY DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY SHOULD REMAIN UNDERINCLUSIVE
For once, the Supreme Court has the law just right: “[F]or bribery, there
must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of
value in exchange for an official act,”128 and campaign contributions may
be treated as bribes only when “the payments are made in return for an

119. See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
120. See Ryan, 688 F.3d at 852.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 852 (quoting Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2010),
aff’d, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012)). The
court was correct that “the jury rejected the good faith motive.” Under the instructions,
however, the jury could have found a lack of good faith simply because Ryan failed to
disclose a conflict of interest, and it might have found nondisclosure of a conflict even if
Ryan’s only reason for approving the contract was to promote effective law enforcement.
For present purposes, disregard that difficulty and assume that the jury did reject Ryan’s
claim that his only reason for approving the contract was to advance the public good.
Imagine that Ryan acted in whole or in part to benefit his friend Warner and that the jury so
found.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 850.
126. See id.
127. For a memoir of Ryan’s case describing several rulings by the Seventh Circuit that
are even more troubling than the one described here, see Albert W. Alschuler, How Frank
Easterbrook Kept George Ryan in Prison, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
128. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S 398, 404–05 (1999).
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explicit promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to perform an official
act.”129
In a concurring opinion one year after the Court required an “explicit”
quid pro quo for campaign contributions alleged to be bribes, Justice
Kennedy objected to this requirement: “The official and the payor need not
state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could
be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”130 As the reference to winks
and nods suggests, it is distressing that the McCormick standard places a
premium on indirection. The Supreme Court has made achieving the
functional equivalent of bribery so easy that one may wonder why anyone
ever resorts to the real thing. The only thing that can be said for the Court’s
“explicit” quid pro quo requirement is that the alternative would be worse.
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted
contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of favoritism for these
contributors. This pattern may bespeak conviction, not corruption.
Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can easily infer a
corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an official has
supported widget subsidies after accepting large contributions from widget
manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and jurors may infer that there
must have been an implicit understanding. Allowing inferences of this sort
whenever officials have acted to benefit contributors could make public life
intolerable. One state has gone beyond McCormick by declaring that a
properly reported campaign contribution may not be treated as a bribe at
all.131 A narrow definition of bribery like McCormick’s reduces the
likelihood of “inferences” based on cynicism.
As a special prerogative of their position, law school teachers are allowed
to pose hypothetical cases that never could happen. I therefore invite you to
imagine that the great philosopher Aristotle, resurrected from the dead, is
elected Governor of New Jersey.
Unlike anyone who has actually been Governor of New Jersey, Aristotle
gives no thought to his own welfare or that of his family, friends, and
supporters. He believes that “governments which rule with a view to the
private interest . . . are perversions.”132 Aristotle is incorruptible, and his
focus on the public good never falters.
But the inevitable happens. Many of Aristotle’s decisions benefit people
who have supported him politically, and others benefit people who have
done favors for him and members of his family. And when the inevitable
happens, critics point to Aristotle and say, “Aha! Behold! One hand
washes the other. We always knew that guy was no different from the rest
of them.”
129. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
130. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 162.005, 162.015 (2011); cf. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 36.02(a)(4) (West 2015) (requiring “direct evidence of [an] express agreement” to “take or
withhold a specific exercise of official discretion” before a campaign contribution may be
treated as a bribe).
132. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 114.
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The U.S. Attorney ultimately charges Aristotle with bribery, extortion,
honest-services fraud, and racketeering. He says that Aristotle accepted
benefits that he must have known were intended to influence him and,
further, that he must have intended to be influenced. The prosecutor adds
that Aristotle failed to disclose the conflicts of interest created by many of
the benefits he received. He invites jurors to infer that there must have been
an unspoken understanding that Aristotle would reciprocate in some
unspecified way for the favors he received.
The jurors, many of whom entered the jury box with the conviction that
most politicians are corrupt,133 are astonished by the number of charges.
They convict on every count. The trial judge then lectures Aristotle on how
serious a wrong it is to betray the public trust. He sentences Aristotle to
five years, less than the twenty years proposed by the prosecutor.
Public officials who have been convicted of misconduct and their
attorneys typically maintain that federal prosecutors can convict anyone
they like.134 The complaint sounds like an alibi, but broad definitions of
bribery bring it close to the truth. After presenting a hypothetical case to
mock grand jurors, Christopher Robertson and his coauthors reported that
the vast majority voted to indict officials for “behavior that virtually any of
the 535 Members of Congress engage in every day.”135
Whenever the law of bribery is not underinclusive, it is overinclusive.
There is no Goldilocks position. Indeed, the law of bribery may be
radically underinclusive and radically overinclusive at the same time. It
may leave many functional equivalents of bribery untouched while sending
Aristotle to prison. That’s the corruption dilemma.
V. EX ANTE REGULATIONS
AND WHY THEY MUST BE UNDERINCLUSIVE TOO
Zephyr Teachout writes, “Once corruption is understood as a description
of an emotional orientation, rather than a description of contract-like
exchange, the idea of criminalizing it seems either comical or fascist.”136
Speaking of the kinds of rules commonly found in ethical codes and
campaign finance regulations, she observes, “The emotional nature of
corruption makes it better suited for bright-line rules that are unconcerned
with intent.”137

133. See infra notes 150–61 and accompanying text.
134. See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH ROW: GOVERNOR GEORGE
RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME xi (2008) (quoting Dan Rostenkowski); HARVEY A.
SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT xxxviii
(2009).
135. Christopher Robertson et al., 535 Felons? An Empirical Investigation into the Law
of Political Corruption 7, 27–32 (Feb. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
136. TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 285.
137. Id. at 286. The rules to which Teachout refers are not entirely unconcerned with
intent. The mental state they sometimes require, however, is simply an intent to cross the
bright lines they set forth. No speculation about deeper motivation is required.
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Teachout makes sense. It is only fair to tell officials and their
benefactors what they may and may not do before they act. Rather than
allow jurors to infer that Croesus, a wealthy industrialist, must have
intended to influence Solon, a state legislator, when he entertained Solon at
his ranch and gave him a $25,000 campaign contribution, the law should
tell Solon in advance whether he may accept a weekend at the industrialist’s
ranch and a $25,000 contribution. When corrupting benefits take the form
of campaign contributions, however, the Supreme Court has largely blocked
the most appropriate form of regulation, making expansion of the bribery
net more likely.138
Although Teachout’s position is sound and sensible, anyone who
attempts to draft a code of ethics for public officials will soon learn that this
code cannot block all functional equivalents of bribery. The range of
corrupting practices is wide: soliciting and accepting gifts, accepting
invitations to social events, accepting invitations to professional
conferences, accepting honoraria for speeches, accepting royalties for
publications, accepting referral fees, accepting investment advice,
participating in privately funded fact-finding missions, creating or lending
support to charities, owning stock and other passive investments, engaging
in remunerative employment or private business ventures, negotiating for
future private employment, accepting post-government employment, and
more.
Drawing appropriate lines is challenging. Should Croesus entertain
Solon less lavishly than his other friends, refusing to invite him to the ranch
but meeting him later at Denny’s? Must Solon, having accepted a public
trust, remain cloistered like the members of an ascetic religious order,
refusing to accept hospitality worth more than $50 even from old friends?
Would it be better just to require Solon to report as a gift any entertainment
he receives worth more than $50?139
138. For criticism of the Court’s failure to recognize that campaign contributions are
hybrids of protected speech and unprotected gifts to candidates and that they differ greatly
from other funds used to bring speech to audiences, see Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting
Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 389 (2015). The campaign finance restrictions the Court held invalid in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), were in fact
models of appropriate regulation. For the most part, they provided specific, comprehensible
rules, permitted people potentially affected by these rules to obtain clarification through
advisory opinions, were enforced primarily through civil sanctions, and imposed criminal
penalties only for willful violations. See Quick Answers to Compliance Questions, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_compliance.shtml (last visited Oct.
21, 2012) [http://perma.cc/Z7S8-Q9WE]; Advisory Opinions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ao.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) [http://perma.cc/
BKT3-RXRQ].
139. Mandating disclosure is the regulation of easiest resort. As Omri Ben-Shahar and
Carl E. Schneider observe, “[T]he intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive
alone.” Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2011). This regulatory technique addresses a problem (or makes a
show of it) without notably affecting the public treasury. People burdened by the new
regulations often do not protest lest they be thought to have something to hide. More
information (and more and more) is thought to facilitate wiser decisions, although no one is
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If Solon serves part-time as most state legislators do,140 who may
patronize his law firm, insurance brokerage, or real estate agency? Who
may give his spouse, adult child, or niece a job? Who may contribute to his
favorite charity—or his spouse’s favorite charity?141
Wherever the lines are drawn, people seeking favor are likely to go
beyond them. The authors of an ethical code may determine that the code
should not require the spouses, parents, children, nieces, nephews, and
political associates of public officials to refuse customary gifts and social
invitations or to decline ordinary business opportunities. This judgment,
however, will create an opening for favor-seekers. When people who may
be interested in doing business with the state send silver to family weddings

likely to read it. Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude, “Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei,
luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure.” Id. at 681.
To be sure, the utility of disclosure varies from one situation to the next. When
opponents, the press, and watchdog groups review the mandated disclosures of political
candidates and elected officials, they discover things the public should know. Nevertheless,
the disclosures of candidates and elected officials often do not convey useful information,
see LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 251–60, and the disclosures of less prominent
public employees are likely to remain unread on the internet and in file drawers.
Compliance with reporting requirements also is likely to be burdensome. Abner
Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, former White
House counsel, and recent recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, declared,
[W]e already require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior
officials spend countless hours preparing countless disclosure forms . . . . The
reports are so complicated that most reviewers can’t understand what they are
reviewing, but they do serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary official.
Abner J. Mikva, Opinion, From Politics to Paranoia, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 1995),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/11/26/from-politics-toparanoia/08b95ba8-ca04-462d-9b40-fe72982fdba3/ [http://perma.cc/943G-T8FM]. Mikva
observed, “[G]overnment cannot daily prove its rectitude to the cynic convinced of
government’s corruption.” Id.
140. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 1,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.
aspx (noting that the work of a state legislator is a full-time job in only ten states)
[http://perma.cc/6HLU-6FTA].
141. In Louisiana, Supriya Jindal created the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana’s
Children shortly after her husband, Bobby Jindal, became the state’s governor. The Jindal
Foundation provides high-tech equipment to schools, and Mrs. Jindal travels throughout the
state to deliver this equipment personally. One early contributor to the foundation was
AT&T, which gave $250,000. At about the same time, AT&T sought the Governor’s
approval of an arrangement for providing television cable services. Marathon Oil, which
also gave $250,000, sought an increase in the amount of oil it could refine at its facility in
Louisiana. The Governor’s press secretary said of the foundation,
It is a completely nonpolitical, nonpartisan organization created by the first lady,
who as an engineer and the mother of three children, has a passion for helping our
young people learn science and math. . . . Anything other than this reality has
plainly been dreamed up by partisan hacks living in a fantasy land.
See Eric Lipton, Wife’s Charity Offers Corporate Tie to a Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/politics/03jindal.html [http://perma.cc/JZ6YF8FD]; see also Raymond Hernandez & David W. Chen, Gifts to Pet Charities Keep
Lawmakers Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/
us/politics/19charity.html [http://perma.cc/HU7K-DFNH].
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and flowers to family funerals, critics may howl about loopholes and
functional equivalents.142
The effect of ex ante regulation often may be to substitute weaker for
stronger conflicts of interest. In fact, giving a job to an officeholder’s
favorite nephew is usually not the functional equivalent of promising postgovernment employment to the officeholder himself. Although regulations
have hydraulic effects, one should not assume that they can neither reduce
the amount of money devoted to buying influence nor increase the cost of
buying it.143
The impossibility of suppressing all functional equivalents of bribery
through either corrupt-intent bribery laws or ex ante regulations may lead
one to say with Rutherford B. Hayes, “Law is no substitute for
character.”144 Hayes’s observation is noble and spot-on, but it may not be
of great comfort in a world in which all of us have been banished from the
Garden.
VI. FROM STEVENSON TO BLAGOJEVICH:
HAS THE EFFORT TO CLEAN UP GOVERNMENT
THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MADE THINGS BETTER?
Over the past sixty years, Congress has given prosecutors an ever-larger
arsenal of tools for fighting corruption.145 Although the Supreme Court has
reined in the lower federal courts as best it can, these courts have construed
anticorruption measures expansively. Corruption trials have become
longer. Many United States Attorney’s Offices have established Public
Corruption Units,146 and experienced prosecutors have competed for
142. The difficulty of drawing appropriate lines ex ante pushes regulators toward
employing fuzzy mental-state standards ex post. They may declare it permissible for
Croesus to entertain Solon at the ranch if Solon is in fact an old friend but impermissible if
Croesus is trying to influence Solon’s performance of his official duties.
143. But cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always
find an outlet.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[W]e think political money, like
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air.”).
144. Letter from Rutherford B. Hayes to Colonel G. Bickham (Dec. 5, 1888), in 4 DIARY
AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES 426 (Charles R. Williams ed., 1922).
145. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (the Travel Act, enacted in 1961); id. §§ 1961–
1968 (the RICO Act, enacted in 1970); id. § 666 (the federal program bribery statute,
enacted in 1984); id. § 1956 (the Money Laundering Control Act, enacted in 1986); id.
§ 1346 (the honest-services statute, enacted in 1988); Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat.
745, 800 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341) (part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, increasing
the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from five to twenty years). Although
members of Congress speak of giving “tools” to prosecutors, they seem never to speak of
giving “tools” to defense attorneys.
146. See, e.g., The United States Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York:
Criminal Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 14, 2015), www.justice.gov/usaosdny/criminal-division (describing the Public Corruption Unit in the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York) [http://perma.cc/33QC-JE9E]; The United States
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois: About, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July
24, 2015), www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/about (“[T]he Public Corruption and Organized Crime
Section continues the office’s long tradition of prosecuting those who violate the public
trust . . . .”) [http://perma.cc/GR92-WSAP]; The United States Attorney’s Office for the
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assignments to these units. In addition, the Justice Department has created
a Public Integrity Section staffed by “about 30 prosecutors who travel the
country to help local United States attorney’s offices develop complex and
often politically contentious corruption cases.”147 In 1976, federal
prosecutors indicted 337 officials for corruption, a five-fold increase from
the number six years earlier.148 The number of officials prosecuted
annually by the federal government today is about eight hundred.149
Perhaps the federal effort to lock up public officials has given America
better and less corrupt government, but if it has, the public has not noticed.
The percentage of Americans who believe that “quite a few” government
officials are “crooked” has doubled in fifty years (from 24 percent in 1958
to 51 percent in 2008),150 and the percentage of people who believe they
can trust the federal government most of the time has dropped by more than
two-thirds in thirty years (from 70 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in
2010).151 Forty-seven percent of the public say that most members of
Congress are corrupt (slightly more than say that most are not corrupt).152
An impressionistic glance toward today’s public officials may also suggest
that the effort to improve government by locking up officials has misfired.

Eastern District of Virginia, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2015), www.justice.gov/usaoedva/criminal-division (describing the Financial Crimes and Public Corruption Unit in the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia) [http://perma.cc/P3K2-HJPS].
147. Charlie Savage, Another High-Profile Failure for a Justice Dept. Watchdog, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/us/edwards-case-a-blow-tojustice-dept-corruption-unit.html [http://perma.cc/9TV7-PAV9].
148. See Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1172 n.1 (1977).
149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND
OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2012 24, 25–26 tbl.II,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2012-Annual-Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4JDLB76N]; TRACREPORTS, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS DECLINE UNDER OBAMA
(2014), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/358/ (reporting somewhat lower figures than
those supplied by the Justice Department) [http://perma.cc/9A8V-8E6B]; Daniel H.
Lowenstein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
CORRUPTION 127, 129 tbl.6.1 (William C. Heffernan & John Lowenstein eds., 2004). The
high-water mark came in 1991 when the federal government prosecuted almost 1200
officials. See id.
150. See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 167 (citing New Judicial Watch/Zogby
Poll: 81.7% of Americans Say Political Corruption Played a “Major Role” in Financial
Crisis, JUDICIAL WATCH (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/pressreleases/new-judicial-watch-zogby-poll-82-7-american-say-political-corruption-playedmajor-role/ [http://perma.cc/9S33-X8A2]).
151. Id. (citing THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT:
DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR (2010), http://people-press.org/
files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf [http://perma.cc/L9W2-SHLL]; JEFFREY BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY
MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 10
(2000)).
152. Joseph Carroll, Americans Increasingly View Most Members of Congress As
Corrupt, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (May 17, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/22837/
americans-increasingly-view-most-members-congress-corrupt.aspx [http://perma.cc/2U83-3
RUT]; see also INST. OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, SURVEY OF YOUNG AMERICANS’
ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE (2013), http://www.iop.harvard.edu/
sites/default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/6QH2-4G3J].
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My home state, Illinois, has gone within my memory from Governor Adlai
Stevenson to Governor Rod Blagojevich.
The Stevenson-to-Blagojevich observation may provoke your own
impressionistic assessment, but I confess that it’s a rhetorical ploy. Most
public officials were not as virtuous as Adlai Stevenson sixty years ago, and
few are as lacking in character as Rod Blagojevich today.
In 1948, the year Stevenson was elected governor, the election of a
Democratic majority in the Illinois House made Representative Paul Powell
a leading candidate to become Speaker. Powell famously remarked on
election night, “I can smell the meat a-cookin.”153 He did become Speaker
and later Secretary of State, and when he died in 1970, people found
$800,000 in cash in shoeboxes, briefcases, and strongboxes in his
Springfield hotel suite.154 They also found forty-nine cases of whiskey,
fourteen transistor radios, and two cases of creamed corn.155 Although
Powell’s salary never exceeded $30,000 per year, he left an estate worth
$4.6 million, $1 million of it in racetrack stock.156
Your speculation about whether federal corruption prosecutions have
made things better or worse is as good as mine. My own guess, however, is
“both.” My sense is that officials like Powell have become less common
than they were sixty years ago, and so have officials like Stevenson.
Federal corruption prosecutions may have played a part in both stories.
Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation found $90,000 in cash in
Congressman William Jefferson’s freezer in 2005,157 corruption
prosecutions today rarely involve shoeboxes stuffed with cash or offshore
bank accounts. The officials who wind up in prison are likely to be figures
like Alabama Governor Don Siegelman, accused of agreeing to appoint
someone to a state board in exchange for financial support of a program to
generate education funds,158 and Robert Sorich, a Chicago mayoral aide
accused of patronage hiring in violation of a civil consent decree.159 The
public’s greater mistrust of public officials may reflect changed standards or
simply a more resentful mood rather than either the officials’ changed
behavior or the public’s changed perception of what they do.160
153. See MERRINER, supra note 134, at 17.
154. Steve Aschburner, Déjà Vu: Growing Up with Chicago Pols in the ‘Land of 10,000
Snakes’, MINNPOST (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/
12/d%C3%A9j%C3%A0-vu-growing-chicago-pols-land-10000-snakes
[http://perma.cc/
787Z-GAYD].
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Jerry Markon, Ex-Rep. Jefferson (D-La.) Gets 13 Years in Bribe Case, WASH.
POST (Nov. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/
AR2009111301266.html [http://perma.cc/WP9B-L32U].
158. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165–68 (11th Cir. 2011).
159. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008); Sorich v. United
States, No. 10 C 1069, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86213 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2011).
160. Few public officials banish altogether from their thoughts and actions the impulse to
aid friends and supporters and to encourage further support. Unfortunate though their
favoritism may be, even the best officials are likely to give friends and supporters a leg up.
This conduct once did not spark moral indignation. When cronyism went too far and
appeared to compromise the public interest, political opponents might complain, people
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If shoeboxes full of cash are indeed rarer today, perhaps the reason is that
public officials and their corruptors now have more class. They may have
learned that campaign contributions and other “functional equivalents,”
even if not “equivalent,” are plenty good enough. Cash bribes may have
become infrequent not only because they are criminal but also because they
are unnecessary. I am inclined to believe, however, that deterrence through
criminal punishment has played a part.161
Deterring bribery is a fine idea, but deterring Adlai Stevenson from
running for office is not. Federal corruption prosecutions might have made
twenty-first century Stevensons less likely to enter politics for two reasons.
First, these prosecutions reflect and reinforce the dark view of politicians
voiced by economists, taxi drivers, and radio talk-show callers. When
office-holders are presumed corrupt, many virtuous people may find the
game not worth playing. Daniel Patrick Moynihan commented, “[P]olitics,
business, and war have ever been the affairs of adventurers and risk
takers,”162 and Moynihan’s observation may be especially true today. The
adventurers still attracted to the game may be more likely than today’s
Adlai Stevensons to cut corners. Criminal prosecutions probably have
contributed to rather than ameliorated the public’s sense that most
politicians are “crooked.”
Second, corruption prosecutions reinforce the sense that running for
office means entering a world of sharpened knives. Although a twenty-first
century Stevenson might not be concerned that seeking office could land
him in the cell next to Aristotle’s, he could not avoid noticing that to enter
politics is to enter a jungle. Candidates today must not only be wary of the
knives of others but also consider how sharp a knife to wield themselves. A
present day Stevenson might well conclude that, if he wants to be
successful, he cannot remain Adlai Stevenson.163 Although journalists,
political consultants, and politicians have done more than prosecutors to
make politics a game of “gotcha,” prosecutors have played a part.164
might call for more civil service reform or competitive bidding, and voters might fail to
reelect an official. But no one seemed to demand long prison terms.
161. When I wrote an article about the prosecution of former Illinois governor George
Ryan, my goal was to criticize the overreach of Congress, federal prosecutors, and the
courts, not to advance the cause of effective law enforcement. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Mail Fraud & Rico Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 113
(2006). Someone told me, however, that the Speaker of the Illinois House circulated copies
of my article to his staff along with a note asking them to notice how easy it is to get in
trouble. If the story is true, it illustrates deterrence in action.
162. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, When the Irish Ran New York, CITY JOURNAL (Spring
1993), http://www.city-journal.org/article02.php?aid=1499 [http://perma.cc/7P73-5VPZ].
163. Stevenson once said, “The hardest thing about any political campaign is how to win
without proving that you are unworthy of winning.” See Larry J. Sabato, Foreword to
THOMAS J. BALDINO & KYLE L. KREIDER, U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: A DOCUMENTARY AND
REFERENCE GUIDE xv, xvii (2011) (quoting Stevenson). What was the hardest thing when
Stevenson ran for office sometimes may be an impossible thing today.
164. The DOJ censured U.S. Attorney Thomas DiBiagio after a newspaper learned of
memoranda he had sent his staff. DiBiagio told his subordinates that he wanted three “front
page” white collar or public corruption indictments by November 6, a date close to election
day. See Editorial, A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST (July 20, 2004), http://www.

2015]

CRIMINAL CORRUPTION

491

CONCLUSION
Government corruption stirs resentment. It unites almost everyone,
including members of both the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party
movements. When public officials and their benefactors can engage in
practices that resemble bribery and escape punishment, people get angry.
Nearly everyone appears to favor broader anti-corruption laws. They may
assume that the only reason these laws don’t exist already is that lawmakers
are corrupt and want to stay that way.
This Article has argued, however, that broader anticorruption laws
generally make things worse. It has traced the history of two competing
concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept and the “illegal
contract” concept—and it has taken the language of various definitions of
bribery more seriously than this language often has been taken.
“Intent to influence” may be an appropriate standard when applied to
benefits given to appointed judges (both in the seventeenth century and
today), but it is a preposterous standard when applied in the twenty-first
century to people who must collect donations to run for office and who are
appropriately subject to persuasion in a wide variety of social settings
bearing little resemblance to a courtroom. The “illegal contract” concept is
more appropriate.
Although the Supreme Court’s refusal to treat campaign contributions as
bribes in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo is easily criticized

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63069-2004Jul19.html
[http://perma.cc/N6U2-HE
PD]. In view of the incentives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, one commentator expressed
surprise that anyone was surprised. See George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 403 (2005).
When a Justice Department task force examined the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys
during the administration of President George W. Bush, it found evidence that some had
been encouraged to file prosecutions for political reasons. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 190–200 (2008). In
what was probably the most egregious case, the task force documented a stream of phone
calls and other communications from Republican office holders and party officials to David
Iglesias, the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Mexico. The communications encouraged
faster and more vigorous prosecution of Democrats in two corruption cases and a voting
fraud case. Id. at 53.
A call late in the series came on October 26, 2006, shortly before the elections of
that year. In an apparent reference to one of the corruption cases, U.S. Senator Pete
Domenici asked whether he could expect an indictment before November. When Iglesias
answered that he did not think so, Domenici said, “Well, I’m very sorry to hear that” and
hung up. Id. at 179.
On Election Day, November 7, Domenici’s Chief of Staff wrote in an email to the
President’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor Karl Rove, “We worry still about the
USA here.” Id. at 185. At a White House meeting one week later, Heather Wilson, a
Republican Member of Congress, remarked to Rove that “the U.S. Attorney in New Mexico
is a waste of breath.” Rove replied, “That decision has already been made. He’s gone.” Id.
On December 7, a deputy White House counsel informed Senator Domenici’s office
that Iglesias would be asked to resign. The counsel then emailed a DOJ official that
“Domenici’s COS [Chief of Staff] is happy as a clam.” Id. Another DOJ official requested
Iglesias’s resignation the same day. See id. at 190–200.
Even when prosecutors are not partisan and are not subject to outside pressure, they
are likely to view a state’s governor in the same way a big game hunter views a cape buffalo.
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(“That’s not how it’s done!”), inviting inferences of criminal behavior
whenever the actions of elected officials have benefitted donors to their
campaigns would be worse. The Court has appropriately rebuffed efforts to
use a statute criminalizing deprivations of “the intangible right of honest
services” to scuttle the quid pro quo requirement. Moreover, although the
currently fashionable “stream of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with
the “illegal contract” concept of bribery, courts should not allow talk of
streams, retainers, meal plans, and open bars to degenerate into a “one hand
washes the other” or “favoritism” standard.
Broad definitions of bribery not only sweep into their net common and
widely accepted behavior, they also invite unjustified inferences and
empower prosecutors to pick their targets. Most people, however, toot only
one horn of the corruption dilemma.

